The arrest of Călin Georgescu, decided twice by a narrow margin: what lies behind the disagreements between the courts?

On two occasions, the Bucharest Court of Appeal (CAB) required a third judge to determine whether Călin Georgescu should be held in pre-trial detention during the investigation. Twice, rulings by the same magistrate at the Bucharest Tribunal, Vlad Andriescu, were overturned following appeals filed by DIICOT prosecutors. In the first instance, a measure of judicial control was replaced by pre-trial detention. In the second, an attempt to substitute detention with house arrest was definitively rejected. The sequence of these decisions raises legitimate questions regarding the assessment of risks in the case and the quality of the judicial reasoning provided. However, the fact that even the judges at the Bucharest Court of Appeal were divided on the outcome necessitates a more thorough analysis than merely counting how many rulings were overturned.

The chronology is essential. On September 22, 2026, the Bucharest Tribunal rejected the DIICOT proposal for pre-trial detention and instead ordered judicial control for a period of 60 days. On September 29, the Bucharest Court of Appeal granted the prosecutors' appeal and ordered pre-trial detention for 30 days. On October 13, Judge Vlad Andriescu granted a request to replace pre-trial detention with house arrest. On Friday, October 23, the Court of Appeal overturned this decision as well, and Georgescu remains in pre-trial detention. Consequently, the two instances of disagreement occurred 24 days apart, in two different calendar months, yet within a span of less than a month.

The first episode demonstrated that the disagreement was not limited to the conflict between the prosecutors and the judge at the Tribunal. On September 29, judges Violeta-Elena Georgescu-Ashemimry and Cristina Grecu could not reach a consensus regarding preventive measures. A "divergence panel" was formed with the addition of judge Dragoş Mirea, and the final decision was to impose pre-trial detention. Thus, the detention did not stem from a unanimous assessment by the appellate court, but rather from the formation of a majority following the expansion of the panel.

On October 23, the same mechanism played out again. The two judges reviewing the appeal against house arrest held differing opinions, necessitating the involvement of a third magistrate. The definitive ruling, issued after the formation of the divergence panel, upheld the pre-trial detention. This recurrence is significant: in both instances, the more severe outcome was adopted only after resolving a disagreement within the Bucharest Court of Appeal.

What, in practical terms, is a "divergence panel"? Article 19 of Law no. 304/2022 stipulates that if two judges fail to reach an agreement on a ruling, the case must be reheard by a divergence panel, which includes a judge designated via the court's duty roster. This third magistrate participates in the adjudication of the case and in the formulation of the final decision. A judge is not required to automatically endorse the position of the prosecutor or that of a colleague. The procedure allows the court to issue a ruling even when the panel of judges is divided. The existence of such a divergence indicates a disagreement regarding the outcome, but it does not reveal the full reasoning behind it. To determine exactly which evidence was interpreted differently by each judge, or which argument proved decisive, one must examine the written justifications and any separate opinions. It would be unwarranted to interpret the mere composition of the panel as evidence that one magistrate is shielding the defendant, or that another is intent on securing their detention at any cost.

The Code of Criminal Procedure requires that any preventive measure be proportionate to the gravity of the charge and necessary to achieve specific objectives: ensuring the proper conduct of the legal proceedings, preventing the defendant from evading justice, or averting the commission of further offenses. While the seriousness of the case is a factor, the court must also assess the specific, concrete risks. Pre-trial detention cannot serve as a substitute for a criminal conviction, and the selection of a less restrictive measure does not, in itself, constitute a finding of innocence.

In its reasoning for the detention order issued in September, the Bucharest Court of Appeal (CAB) identified factors it deemed relevant to the risk of the defendant evading justice. The court pointed to discussions regarding relocating to Italy, securing a property there, and steps taken toward seeking political asylum. The majority concluded that the risks to the judicial process were immediate and that a less restrictive measure would be insufficient. These are judicial conclusions reached during the assessment of a preventive measure; they do not equate to a definitive determination of guilt. Judge Vlad Andriescu subsequently offered a different assessment. According to the reasoning provided in October, the magistrate emphasized the defendant's prior procedural conduct specifically, their compliance with summonses from the authorities, as well as the absence of a criminal record and the existence of a stable place of residence. He deemed the time elapsed since the alleged acts and the non-violent nature of the charged offenses to be relevant factors. In his view, house arrest was sufficient to ensure the proper conduct of the legal proceedings, and maintaining in pre-trial detention was disproportionate.

Herein lies the critical question for analyzing the Tribunal's ruling: to what extent did the arguments regarding the defendant's conduct and personal circumstances specifically address the risks previously identified by the Court of Appeal (CAB)? The existence of a permanent residence, a family, or the absence of prior criminal convictions are relevant factors; however, they do not automatically negate evidence suggesting a potential risk of absconding. Similarly, the fact that the charges involve non-violent offenses does not, in itself, resolve the issue of whether detention is necessary. The reasoning must link every conclusion to the specific facts of the case.

Conversely, the September ruling could not render the detention a measure that was beyond re-evaluation. The law allows for a pre-trial measure to be replaced by a less restrictive one. Any subsequent application requires an assessment of the conditions as they exist at the time the application is decided. Therefore, the fact that the judge at the Tribunal considered the possibility of house arrest does not, in itself, constitute an act of defiance toward the Court of Appeal. The essential point is whether the judge's reasoning met legal requirements and addressed the relevant arguments.

What, then, should happen to a judge whose two rulings have been overturned? The first logical step is a rigorous examination of the reasoning provided, measured against the findings of the appellate court. Two overturned rulings within a short period naturally invite public and professional scrutiny. However, this does not automatically trigger disciplinary liability, nor does it allow for the pre-emptive determination of a sanction. Law no. 303/2022 provides for sanctions in cases where judicial duties are exercised in bad faith or with gross negligence. Article 272 requires, in the case of bad faith, a conscious violation of rules, with the intent to cause or the acceptance of the possibility of causing-harm to an individual. Gross negligence entails a culpable, serious, unequivocal, and inexcusable disregard for the rules. These conditions must be proven; the mere difference between the ruling of the Tribunal and that of the Bucharest Court of Appeal (CAB) does not constitute such proof.

If an analysis of the documents were to reveal such violations, it would be appropriate to notify the Judicial Inspection and initiate disciplinary proceedings. Any potential sanction would fall under the jurisdiction of the Section for Judges of the Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM), in accordance with the law. In the absence of such indications, a request for suspension or dismissal based solely on two overturned rulings would conflate judicial review with the penalization of a legal opinion.

It is precisely these two instances of divergence that make this distinction essential. They demonstrate that disagreement regarding the preventive measure existed even among the judges of the higher court. While this circumstance does not automatically validate Vlad Andriescu's reasoning, it undermines any conclusion that the erroneous nature of his rulings would have been obvious to all the magistrates who reviewed the case.

The recurrence of such a divergence does not give rise to a special procedural sanction, nor does it prove the existence of political factions within the court, nor does it establish the guilt of the defendant. Its verifiable significance is simply that, on two successive occasions, the judges of the Bucharest Court of Appeal reached different conclusions regarding the appropriate course of action. The public interest lies in the need for exceptionally clear justifications: why judicial control was deemed insufficient in September, why the Tribunal considered house arrest adequate in October, and why the majority of the Bucharest Court of Appeal (CAB) rejected this assessment.

Călin Georgescu remains in pre-trial detention following two interventions by the Bucharest Court of Appeal and two "divergence panels" (panels convened to resolve judicial disagreement). The accountability of the judge at the Tribunal must be examined based on any demonstrable violations of the law. The justice system owes the public convincing explanations for these conflicting rulings; furthermore, any request for disciplinary sanctions must meet the same standard of rigor that we demand of judicial decisions themselves.