The EU's ballistic arsenal is almost non-existent

The conflict in Iran and the threat expressed by the regime in Tehran to launch ballistic missiles, including against Europe, if it does not take a clear stance against the war launched by the US and Israel in the Middle East, have revealed a harsh reality: the European Union has a very limited arsenal, according to an investigation published at the end of last week by the Euractiv website.

The cited source notes that the wars that have erupted in recent years on the periphery of Europe, from Ukraine to the escalations in the Middle East, have demonstrated unequivocally that long-range missiles are one of the decisive weapons of modern conflicts. Repeated ballistic missile strikes launched by Iran in the region, as well as Russian bombings of Ukrainian infrastructure, have brought long-range strike capability back to the forefront, an area in which Europe is proving vulnerable. While the world's major military powers - the United States, Russia and China - have vast arsenals of ballistic missiles, from tactical systems to intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, the European Union has very few such capabilities and is largely dependent on the American strategic umbrella. Ballistic missiles are weapons that climb to high altitudes, often to the edge of space, before returning to their target at enormous speeds, making them extremely difficult to intercept. They can hit targets hundreds or even thousands of kilometres away with increasing precision, and in the case of nuclear variants, they can carry multiple independent warheads. In theory, a similar function could be fulfilled by cruise missiles, which fly at low altitudes to avoid radar, but they are slower and, in many cases, more vulnerable. That is why states aspiring to the status of major military powers are developing both types of systems, and ballistic missiles remain the central element of strategic deterrence.

In Europe, however, the situation is different. The only power in the European Union that has a complete strategic ballistic arsenal is France. According to the cited source, the French arsenal contains M51 missiles, launched from Triomphant-class nuclear submarines, each of these missiles having a range of over 8,000 kilometers and the capacity to carry several nuclear warheads. The system constitutes the backbone of the French nuclear deterrence doctrine, and France possesses approximately 290 nuclear warheads, most of which are intended for these missiles. The aerospace company ArianeGroup, which produces the M51, is working in parallel on the development of long-range ground-launched strike systems, with an estimated range of approximately 2,000 kilometers, which would mark a significant expansion of European military capabilities.

Britain, although no longer a member of the European Union, remains the continent's other major nuclear power, the cited source shows. The British arsenal is based on American-made Trident II D5 ballistic missiles, also launched from nuclear submarines. London has about 225 nuclear warheads and maintains its deterrence strategy based on the permanent presence of a nuclear submarine on patrol. At the same time, the British are developing new ground-launched tactical ballistic systems, in a program known as "Nightfall", with an estimated range of about 500-600 kilometers. The project has a clear geopolitical dimension: the creation of a relatively cheap and quickly produced weapon that can be used or supplied to allies to counter Russian missile attacks, including in the context of the war in Ukraine.

Beyond these two powers, most European states do not possess long-range ballistic missiles. Greece, for example, one of the EU countries closest to the Middle East and Iran, has only short-range tactical ballistic systems. The Greek army uses American-made MGM-140 ATACMS missiles and has recently acquired Israeli-made LORA missiles, with a maximum range of around 400 kilometers. These weapons are designed for tactical strikes on the battlefield and cannot be compared to the strategic systems used by the great powers.

The explanation for this European deficit lies not only in military investment but also in history. For more than three decades, the INF Treaty signed in 1987 between the United States and the Soviet Union banned ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Europe, caught in the middle of the confrontation between the two superpowers, was practically demilitarized in this area. After the denunciation of the treaty by the Russian Federation and then by the USA, the development of such weapons became possible again, but the European continent started with a major deficit. All this time, Russia, China and the United States has continued to invest heavily in ballistic and hypersonic systems, making them pillars of their military strategies.

Faced with this gap, several European states have begun to look for common solutions. One of the most important initiatives is the European Long-Range Strike Approach program, launched in 2024 by France, Germany, Italy and Poland, later joined by Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The project aims to develop a European long-range strike capability, including ground-launched missiles capable of exceeding 2,000 kilometers. The idea is to give Europe its own rapid reaction capability, independent of the American arsenal. However, the project is still in its early stages, and concrete results are slow to emerge, partly due to industrial rivalries and the different priorities of the participating states.

In parallel, Europe is also investing increasingly in missile defense systems. The European Sky Shield initiative, launched by Germany and supported by more than twenty European states, aims to build an integrated air and ballistic missile defense system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones. The program includes technologies such as the Israeli Arrow 3 system and the American Patriot and IRIS-T platforms, creating a layered shield designed to protect critical infrastructure and European cities.

All these initiatives reflect a profound change in the continent's strategic mindset. After decades in which European security was mainly guaranteed by NATO and the United States, wars near the EU's borders have brought strategic autonomy back into question. The idea of a "European nuclear umbrella", possibly extended by France to other allies, is being discussed more and more often in European capitals. At the same time, the continent's military industries are starting to invest in new generations of ballistic and hypersonic missiles, trying to quickly recover lost ground.

The fact is that, at this moment, Europe finds itself in an era of major geopolitical confrontations with a ballistic missile arsenal much more modest than that of its strategic rivals. In an era when the ability to strike quickly and from a great distance can decide the fate of a conflict, this deficit becomes not only a military problem, but also a political one.