CSAT: Suspension of Romatsa activity - major systemic vulnerability to national security

A possible suspension of ROMATSA activity would generate a major systemic vulnerability to national security, causing the immediate degradation of integrated airspace surveillance and the disruption of NATO tactical or logistical missions on the Eastern Flank, established yesterday the members of the Supreme Council for National Defense (CSAT), who specified that the company in question is the only provider of air navigation services in the national airspace.

The press release issued by the Presidential Administration at the end of the CSAT meeting indicates that in February 2026, the Bucharest Court of Appeal decided to suspend for 30 days the Certificate by which ROMATSA is a provider of air navigation services, following a lawsuit filed by twelve air traffic controllers accusing the company of discrimination in hiring. The decision of the Court of Appeal is not final or enforceable.

"This operational blockade would lead to geopolitical isolation by forcing the rerouting of European transit corridors, critical in the context of the conflicts in the Eastern Neighborhood, severely eroding Romania's credibility as a regional security provider in relation to EUROCONTROL. Domestically, the blockade of air traffic management would affect the commercial, cargo and emergency transport infrastructure, causing asymmetric economic damage and blocking strategic supply chains. In this regard, the members of the Council decided that the Government of Romania, through the public authorities with competences in the field, should take the necessary measures to identify solutions for the continuation of air navigation services and airspace security”, the cited document states.

• How the ROMATSA case became a national security issue

At the heart of the whole story is a conclusion formulated as early as February 2020 by a state institution. The National Council for Combating Discrimination officially found that ROMATSA discriminated against 12 graduates of the Higher School of Civil Aviation in hiring and fined the management 10,000 lei. The amount of the fine is almost symbolic compared to what was to follow. Much more important was the official finding that the recruitment procedures did not respect the principles of equal opportunities, after the young people were told that the air traffic controller positions were not put out to competition, but filled through an internal selection procedure.

Normally, such a decision should have determined the change of rules and the correction of recruitment mechanisms. However, this did not happen. The litigation continued, and the problem was not resolved from the ground up. Instead of eliminating the cause of the conflict, it was pushed from one procedural stage to another, until it reached the Bucharest Court of Appeal.

The ruling issued by the Bucharest Court of Appeal on February 27, 2026 completely changed the dimension of the case. The court ordered the suspension, for a period of one month, of the air traffic service provider certificate held by ROMATSA, an unprecedented measure in terms of the impact it could have on the functioning of the national air traffic management system. From that moment on, the dispute was no longer just about the rights of some graduates or a labor dispute, but about the effects that the application of a court decision could have on a critical infrastructure of the Romanian state.

The stakes are huge because ROMATSA is the only entity authorized to provide air traffic services in Romania. In the event of the effective suspension of the certificate, the consequences could go as far as the impossibility of managing flights taking off and landing at airports in the country, but also of aircraft transiting Romanian airspace. In the midst of the summer season, such a scenario could mean the disruption of up to 2,000 flights per day and would also affect the airspace administered for the Republic of Moldova. From this perspective, the case has gone far beyond the boundaries of a simple dispute and has become a problem of continuity of an essential public service.

This is also the reason why the file ended up on the table of the Supreme Council of National Defense. The CSAT did not analyze the conflict between former graduates and ROMATSA per se, but the implications that the execution of a court decision could have on the security of airspace and the functioning of a strategic infrastructure. Basically, the Romanian state is now forced to treat as a national security vulnerability a situation that had been identified and administratively sanctioned six years ago.

The irony is obvious. In 2020, the state officially found the existence of discrimination and applied a fine of 10,000 lei. In 2026, the same issue ends up being discussed at the highest level of Romania's security architecture. The difference is not given by the seriousness of the initial facts, but by the lack of measures to prevent the escalation of the conflict. What could have been resolved by modifying internal procedures and by respecting the principles of transparency in recruitment has evolved, in the absence of real reform, into a crisis with a potential impact on all air traffic.

At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the file is not closed. The last word belongs to the High Court of Cassation and Justice, which is to decide whether the decision of the Bucharest Court of Appeal will remain final or will be modified. Not only the fate of the litigation depends on the decision of the supreme court, but also the legal effects that this case will produce on ROMATSA's activity.

In the meantime, the case continues to generate reactions in the judicial system as well. Today it became public that the Judicial Inspection has taken notice of the sentence pronounced by the Bucharest Court of Appeal, and will verify the aspects related to the manner in which the decision was pronounced. The Judicial Inspection's approach does not change the procedural situation nor does it suspend the effects of the appeals, but it shows that the scope and consequences of the decision have drawn attention to the manner in which this case was resolved in court.

Beyond the verdict that the High Court will pronounce, the ROMATSA case remains an example of the costs of institutional inaction. It was not a fine of 10,000 lei that brought the file onto the CSAT agenda, but the fact that, for six years, the officially reported problem was not resolved. In a functional state, dysfunctions are corrected when they are identified. In the absence of reforms and administrative responsibility, they continue to grow until they far exceed the framework in which they initially appeared and end up calling into question the functioning of essential areas. The ROMATSA case demonstrates that the reform of state-owned companies and public utilities is not just a bureaucratic issue or a conditionality assumed through the PNRR, but can become an issue that directly concerns national security and the state's capacity to prevent administrative problems from turning into strategic crises.

• Romania's objectives at the NATO summit, analyzed by the CSAT

Another important topic on the agenda of yesterday's CSAT meeting was the analysis and approval of Romania's objectives at the NATO Summit, which will take place between July 7-8, 2026, in Ankara.

"For Romania, the stakes are clear and include reconfirming and consolidating our country's profile as a reliable NATO ally that contributes significantly to Euro-Atlantic security. From this perspective, the Summit represents an opportunity to present Romania's progress in fulfilling the financial commitments assumed in The Hague, as well as in the field of the defense industry, including by adequately capitalizing on the initiatives for the defense industry, carried out both at NATO and EU level, as well as our efforts in support of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and security in the Black Sea area. At the same time, the Ankara meeting represents an opportunity to bring back to the attention of the Allies at the highest level the complicated situation in the Black Sea region and the consequences that Russian aggression has at the regional level and on Romania, through incidents such as those with drones. We will request that NATO continue to treat these threats with the utmost attention, by ensuring a strong deterrence and defense posture and an appropriate military presence in the area and on Romanian territory. At the end of the discussions on this theme, the members of the Supreme National Defense Council approved Romania's objectives at the NATO Summit in Ankara", the press release issued by the Presidential Administration states.

Following the meeting, the members of the Council analyzed and approved the armed forces of Romania that can be made available for participation in missions and operations outside the territory of the Romanian state in 2027. Thus, the Romanian Army will ensure, for the forces and means that can be made available for participation in missions and operations outside the territory of the Romanian state in 2027, a staff of 5,358 military and civilians. Of these, 2,786 will participate in missions and operations outside the territory of the Romanian state, 1,801 military will be on standby, on national territory, with the possibility of being deployed upon order, and 771 military will be within the forces proposed for missions and operations that may be assumed.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs will be able to participate in missions and operations in 2027 with a staff of 2,604 military and police officers, of whom 39 will participate in missions and operations outside the territory of the Romanian state, and 2,565 military personnel will be on standby, on national territory, with the possibility of being deployed upon order.

The Ministry of National Defense has requested supplementing the contribution to the Mine Countermeasures Black Sea Task Group (MCM BLACK SEA), a vital strategic initiative for guaranteeing freedom of navigation and economic and military security in the Black Sea, with a view to securing the command for it in 2027. The establishment of MCM BLACK SEA, in January 2024, by Romania, Turkey and Bulgaria, represents a first in the recent history of Black Sea security and a project of strategic importance for our country, aimed at maintaining the safety of maritime traffic in the Black Sea, including the protection of critical submarine infrastructure, by expanding the functions of the MCM BLACK SEA maritime demining operation.