How close are we to a world war?

The world is entering a phase of pre‑configuration for a global conflict, in which several regional wars are beginning to connect strategically.

The outbreak of war between the United States/Israel and Iran creates concrete mechanisms through which existing conflicts - Ukraine and the Middle East - could become interdependent.

Analysis of the current situation shows four main pathways through which escalation could transform regional crises into a global conflict.

• 1. The first pathway is a NATO-Iran incident around Turkey (denied by Iranian authorities).

If an Iranian missile were to enter the airspace of a NATO state and be intercepted, and the incident produced casualties, the regional crisis could quickly turn into an allied incident.

International media have already reported that an Iranian missile entering Turkish airspace was intercepted by NATO in a context of rapid military escalation - a report denied by Iranian authorities.

Such an episode (real or even fictitious) could trigger the Alliance's collective defense mechanisms, turning the Iranian conflict into a direct confrontation between Iran and NATO states.

• 2. The second pathway is the indefinite blocking of the Strait of Hormuz and the militarization of global energy transport.

Iran has threatened to attack ships attempting to cross this strategic route.

Around 20 million barrels of oil pass through Hormuz every day - almost 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption.

In such a context, importing states could introduce naval escorts for energy transport.

A major naval incident - for example the sinking of a commercial vessel or a strike on a military ship - would bring the fleets of several major powers into direct contact.

Associated Press notes that energy flows through this strait are especially vital for Asia, which could involve states such as China or India in protecting maritime transport.

• 3. The third pathway is the connection between the war involving Iran and the war in Ukraine due to limited military resources.

Missile defense systems and Patriot interceptors are being used simultaneously in both theaters.

Reuters reported that a war with Iran could divert PAC‑3 Patriot interceptors intended for Ukraine, because the same stockpiles are needed to defend U.S. bases and Gulf states.

If resources are redirected, Ukrainian air defense could become more vulnerable, creating a strategic window that Russia might try to exploit.

In this case, two regional wars would influence each other through the same material constraint.

At the same time, the war involving Iran has already created two conditions typical of systemic conflicts:

- The first is the internationalization of the conflict, since Iranian strikes have targeted bases and infrastructure in several Gulf states, which could lead to the formation of a regional military coalition.

- The second is the global economic impact, because tensions in Hormuz affect energy transport and global trade chains.

• 4. The fourth pathway is diversion.

In a system saturated with tension, it does not require a great power to trigger a major crisis. What is required is the capacity to produce an incident with unclear attribution, at a point where major powers cannot afford to "wait for clarification.”

A) Iran and its military structures: direct capacity in Hormuz

Reuters indicates that Iran could attempt to disrupt traffic in Hormuz through drone attacks and potentially through naval mines, mentioning estimates of Iran's mine stockpiles and drone production capacity.

This is an actor with the capacity for direct escalation without needing intermediaries.

B) Armed groups allied with Iran: capacity for incidents without a state signature

Regional networks associated with Iran are described collectively in CSIS analysis about "Iranian networks” in the Middle East, which include Hezbollah, militias in Iraq and other groups (CSIS, March 6, 2025).

Within such networks, an incident that appears "local” can generate reactions that involve states.

C) Actors in Yemen: precedent of attacks on maritime transport

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2722, which explicitly refers to Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea and requires periodic reporting on these attacks (UN Security Council, January 10, 2024).

The precedent matters because it shows how a non‑state group can shift military and economic centers of gravity.

D) Intelligence services and clandestine structures: capacity for "false‑flag operations”

States sometimes use influence and deception operations, including actions presented as if carried out by another actor, in order to shape perceptions and reactions.

In a crisis, the value of such actions increases because decision time decreases.

• Who might be interested in triggering a world war?

The hypothesis that a world war could "settle” rivalries exists. The problem is the cost. A world war does not only settle rivalries. It can settle regimes, economies and even state continuity.

- The United States and China

A general war would put their rivalry at stake but would simultaneously hit trade, finance and energy.

Associated Press shows how quickly a shock in Hormuz pressures Asia.

This makes the interest in a decisive confrontation deeply ambivalent: the hypothetical strategic benefit clashes with the immediate economic cost.

- The European Union and Russia

Russia may benefit if Western resources are divided between fronts, and Reuters describes precisely the pressure on Patriot interceptors.

The European Union loses through energy shock and the weakening of continental security.

Here, the incentive does not look like a "desire for world war,” but rather the "exploitation of windows of opportunity.”

- Israel and Iran

Israel seeks to degrade Iranian capabilities, while Iran seeks to increase the strategic cost for its adversaries.

Reuters describes the scale of drone and missile attacks and their regional consequences.

This is a conflict with a logic of regional escalation. It can become global when it affects alliances and energy flows.

- Ukraine

Ukraine has a vital interest in maintaining the flow of military support.

A war involving Iran could directly compete with this flow through competition for the same type of air‑defense ammunition.

A global conflict would create uncertainty about support, not a guarantee of it.

The world approaches a world war to the extent that it approaches three thresholds:

a) An incident with casualties in an allied state;

b) A major naval incident in Hormuz that triggers permanent escort operations;

c) A visible weakening of Ukraine's air defense through the redistribution of munitions, followed by Russia exploiting the window.

This is where the structural risk lies: not in the declared intention of an actor to start a world war, but in the fact that the system has reached a point where a large or small actor can produce an incident costly enough that others react before they have time to judge.

At present, three essential elements of a world war are still missing:

a) direct military confrontation between the great powers;

b) the full activation of global alliance systems;

c) the total economic mobilization of the states involved.

Russia and China are not directly militarily involved in the Iranian conflict, and Western states are still trying to limit escalation.

Therefore, the current situation resembles more the period of tension accumulation before a global conflict, comparable to the years that preceded the major wars of the twentieth century.

Regional conflicts already exist and are beginning to contaminate one another, but the international system has not yet crossed the threshold of global confrontation.

Although a world war has not begun, the mechanisms that could trigger one are already visible and active.