COVER FIGURE: euro16.541 trillion - the total debt of the EU and its 27 member states as of March 31, 2026 Prosperity on credit: Who pays the EU's bill?

The European Union financed its survival during the pandemic, its economic recovery, and part of its response to new crises through borrowing; however, the resulting bill is increasingly encroaching on the budgets required to fund investments, public services, and the continent's security. The public debt of the 27 member states had reached approximately euro15.7046 trillion by March 31, 2026, according to data published by Eurostat. Separately, as a debt issuer, the European Union held outstanding loans totaling euro836.8 billion as of June 30, 2026, according to the same source. Behind these figures lies a question that will dominate the coming years: how much of Europe's future revenue will fund development, and how much will be earmarked for obligations already incurred? In yesterday's edition of the • BURSA• newspaper, we published an article on the absorption of European funds-a piece that captures precisely this tension.

Read European report: Romania ranks 22nd out of 27 in the absorption of non-repayable funds

To understand the bill facing the European bloc as a whole, two levels must be distinguished. National public debt represents the obligations of each state's public administration, consolidated according to European methodology. The EU's own debt is contracted by the European Commission for authorized programs. When Brussels borrows money from the markets and passes it on to a member state as a loan, there is both an EU obligation to the investor and a state obligation to the EU.

For the time being, a rigorous consolidated balance sheet for the 27 states can be presented as of March 31, 2026, based on Eurostat data published in July. Expressed in billions of euros and rounded, the debt figures were: France, euro3,536.1 billion; Italy, euro3,158.2 billion; Germany, euro2,902 billion; Spain, euro1,739.5 billion; Belgium, euro706.6 billion; the Netherlands, euro517.4 billion; Austria, euro431.4 billion; Greece, euro360.1 billion; Portugal, euro283.1 billion; Finland, euro255.1 billion; Ireland, euro215.4 billion; Slovakia, euro86.8 billion; Croatia, 55.2 billion; Slovenia, 46.3 billion; Lithuania, 36.3 billion; Bulgaria, 34.2 billion; Luxembourg, 26.4 billion; Latvia, 20.4 billion; Cyprus, 20.1 billion; Malta, 11.5 billion; Estonia, 10.6 billion euros. For the six states with national currencies, the same source indicates the total debt in the respective currency: Poland, 2,444.3 billion zlotys; the Czech Republic, 3,827.9 billion crowns; Denmark, 840.4 billion crowns; Hungary, 68,970 billion forints; Romania, 1,169.9 billion lei; Sweden, 2,341 billion crowns. Amounts in different currencies cannot be added directly; the Eurostat aggregate expresses them in euros.

Unfortunately, Eurostat has not yet published the data for the first half of the year-specifically, as of June 30, 2026-but this information will be available on October 21, according to the schedule on the European institution's website; on that date, both the member states' debt levels at the end of the second quarter of 2026 (the end of the first half-year) and public deficits for the same period will be published. The European Central Bank will also publish data for the second quarter, though two days after Eurostat-on October 23-according to the schedule posted on the European institution's website. The national data cited above indicate that, by the end of the first quarter of 2026, pressure was mounting. According to data from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) in Paris, France's debt stood at euro3,595.5 billion-equivalent to 119% of GDP-on June 30, 2026. In just three months, the debt stock had risen by euro59.6 billion. INSEE also shows that the general government treasury position shrank during the same period; consequently, the increase in net debt exceeded that of gross debt. This figure is significant because it distinguishes the accumulation of financial reserves from the actual deterioration of the budgetary position.

Italy, too, had surpassed the level recorded in the first quarter. Data published by the Bank of Italy in September indicate a figure of approximately euro3,229.3 billion at the end of June and euro3,255.5 billion at the end of July.

In its quarterly statement, the Bank of Spain reported a figure of approximately euro1,761 billion-or 101.4% of GDP-for June. The Spanish case illustrates why a mere increase in the total debt amount does not tell the whole story: while the nominal debt stock was higher, the debt-to-GDP ratio had fallen by 1.8 percentage points compared to the previous year. A growing economy can sustain a higher nominal debt with a lower relative burden. Conversely, stagnation can exacerbate the debt burden even when new borrowing slows down.

Austria's debt stood at euro438.9 billion-or 83.6% of GDP-at the end of the first half of the year. Finland reported euro259.6 billion (90.3% of GDP). Slovenia's debt was euro47.707 billion (64.7% of GDP), while the Netherlands-according to CBS-recorded euro523.795 billion. These figures demonstrate that debt expansion is not limited to the major economies of Southern Europe.

In Poland, general government debt calculated according to European methodology reached PLN 2,598.3 billion on June 30, an increase of 11.3% compared to the end of 2025. The Czech Republic reported CZK 3,842.4 billion (43.8% of GDP). Methodological differences can substantially alter the picture of a country; selecting the lowest figure does not constitute analysis, but rather distorts the comparison.

At the Brussels level, the acceleration is evident: the EU's own debt rose from euro738.9 billion at the end of 2025 to euro836.8 billion on March 31, 2026-an increase of approximately euro97.9 billion, or 13.2%, over three months, based on calculations derived from European Commission reports. That stock included euro793.6 billion in bonds and euro43.2 billion in short-term securities. However, not all the borrowed funds had been spent: the Commission held euro121.8 billion in liquidity, earmarked for payments in the second half of the year.

• Why has EU debt risen so sharply?

The decisive shift came with NextGenerationEU, the instrument through which the Union financed post-pandemic recovery and investments in the energy transition, digitalization, and resilience. The Commission estimates it will mobilize up to euro634 billion in borrowing for this program by the end of 2026, compared to the initial ceiling of euro806.9 billion set in 2021. It should be noted that this euro634 billion figure relates to NextGenerationEU, not the Union's total debt.

The architecture of European borrowing subsequently expanded to cover security and external support. The funding plan for the second half of 2026 envisages bond issuances totaling euro80 billion to cover payments linked to NextGenerationEU, support for Ukraine, the SAFE instrument, and other programs. Earlier in the spring, the Commission had already raised its funding target for the first half of the year from euro90 billion to euro100 billion. Europe is thus leveraging its joint borrowing capacity for a broader range of priorities, and any such expansion must be accompanied by a credible explanation regarding the future source of repayment.

At the level of national budgets, the causes go beyond European programs. The Commission's May 2026 forecast points to modest economic activity, higher interest expenses, rising defense spending, and measures to shield consumers and businesses from high energy costs. The Commission projected EU economic growth of just 1.1% in 2026 and 1.4% in 2027, while the aggregate deficit was expected to reach 3.6% of GDP by 2027. When spending consistently exceeds revenue and the economy fails to generate sufficient growth, financing the gap drives up debt levels.

The official outlook for late 2026 and the start of 2027 shows no sign of a trend reversal. The Commission's spring forecast places the aggregate debt of EU states at 84.2% of GDP in 2026 and 85.3% in 2027. However, a methodological distinction requires explanation: the forecast aggregates are not consolidated for inter-state loans, unlike the previously cited Eurostat figure. Directly comparing these percentages without this clarification would exaggerate or misinterpret part of the variation.

National trajectories vary significantly. For 2026 and 2027, the Commission projects debt levels of 118.1% and 120.2% of GDP for France; 138.5% and 139.2% for Italy; 110.5% and 112.8% for Belgium; and 65.8% and 68% for Germany. ...64.5% and 68.3% in Poland. In Romania, the estimates are 61.6% and 63.4%. Greece is projected to drop to 140.7% and then 134.4%, while Spain is expected to fall to 99.6% and 98.9%.

Regarding the EU's own debt, the Commission indicates bond issuances totaling approximately euro180 billion for the full year of 2026, though a portion of this covers the refinancing of maturing debt. Consequently, according to a report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA), the European Union's public debt will exceed euro1 trillion by the beginning of 2027.

• What happens if all obligations are not paid by the due date?

Paying interest and maturing principal maintains creditor confidence and access to financing. This does not mean Europe must pay off the entire outstanding debt stock in a single year. Obligations have staggered maturity dates, and refinancing a maturing bond through a new issuance is standard practice. The original creditor is paid on time, even if the total debt does not decrease. The economic problem arises when refinancing becomes increasingly expensive or when debt grows faster than the capacity to sustain it.

Meeting repayment deadlines can, in turn, entail political and social costs. If revenues do not rise sufficiently, governments may raise taxes, cut other spending, or borrow more. In the long run, the favorable scenario involves productivity-enhancing investments, stronger public revenues, and a credible reduction of imbalances. A country can meet its obligations to creditors flawlessly yet still end up in a more vulnerable position if maturing debt is replaced by more expensive borrowing and productive investments are sacrificed for current expenditure.

In the case of NextGenerationEU, the timeline extends well beyond early 2027: the Commission indicates a repayment period running from 2028 to 2058. Beneficiary states repay the loans, while the EU budget covers the repayment of the grant component. The loans are backed by the European budget and the margin available under the own-resources ceiling. If the proposed new revenue streams do not sufficiently cover the bill, the pressure could shift to national contributions and the fiscal space available for other policies. This is the budgetary implication of the repayment structure, rather than the inevitable announcement of a specific tax.

Delayed repayment creates a different situation. In an agreed restructuring, terms or conditions can be altered to make the debt manageable. In the event of a default, the consequences depend on the contract and the severity of the situation: eroded confidence, costlier financing, limited market access, and losses for bondholders. The European Stability Mechanism explains the role of collective action clauses in organizing a potential restructuring. However, there is no single debt threshold that automatically renders a state insolvent.

For European citizens, the crisis may manifest itself even before an actual default occurs-through postponed investments, additional taxes, pressure on public services, and tighter lending conditions. If financial institutions hold significant amounts of bonds issued by the affected state, a drop in their value can transmit stress to the broader economy. These are potential mechanisms within a stress scenario, not inevitable consequences for every European country.

The euro area possesses intervention tools, but support comes with conditions. The European Stability Mechanism provides assistance contingent upon commitments to adjust economic policies. The ECB's Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) targets unjustified, disorderly deteriorations in financing conditions; assessments take into account debt sustainability and compliance with fiscal and macroeconomic criteria. These mechanisms do not constitute a promise to provide unlimited funding for any deficit.

For Romania, which is outside the euro area, these cannot be regarded as the same direct safety net available to euro area members. Our country faces an additional vulnerability: the European Commission's forecast links the rise in debt to the high primary deficit and increasing interest payments. Under these circumstances, the quality of investments and the ability to access European funds matter more than the mere size of allocations. A completed project can generate economic capacity and future revenue; conversely, lost funding or a project that subsequently requires additional budget outlays can exacerbate financial pressure. Grants help, but they are no substitute for correcting budgetary imbalances.

In light of the data and information above, European Union insolvency is not a scenario to be considered. Debt can finance infrastructure, security, and a more productive economy; it can also defer the cost of decisions without creating the means for repayment. Therefore, the true test of the coming years is whether today's investments will expand the economic freedom of future generations or whether debt servicing will curtail their options. Creditors have deadlines, and political promises must ultimately generate the revenue needed to meet those obligations.