Global Disorganization - Coincidences or Convergence?

The accelerated disorganization of global architecture raises a legitimate question: Are we witnessing a succession of coincidences, or the convergent manifestation of different ways of interpreting the same structural transformation of the world? When factual processes, state strategies, and theoretical doctrines reach similar outcomes, the coincidence hypothesis becomes insufficient.

1. Factual Level: Disorganization as an Objective Process

At the empirical level, disorganization is indisputable. The withdrawal of the United States from multilateral mechanisms, the use of financial sanctions as a recurrent tool of foreign policy, the politicization of critical infrastructures (payments, technology, trade), and the fragmentation of global supply chains are documented facts by institutions such as the IMF, BIS, and WTO.

These evolutions do not express a declared "strategy of chaos” but the result of an accumulation of decisions that:

- increase systemic unpredictability;

- erode the role of global public goods;

- turn stability into a politically contingent variable.

At this level, disorganization is not ideological but functional: actors react defensively to a center that has become unstable.

2. Strategic Level: The Objectives of China (and Russia)

On a different plane, China and Russia have promoted the delegitimization of the unipolar order rather than global disorder.

China

Chinese official documents consistently speak about:

- a multipolar world;

- institutional pluralism;

- economic sovereignty;

- reducing critical dependencies (financial, technological, commercial).

Initiatives such as the Belt and Road, BRICS expansion, the promotion of local-currency payments, or the development of alternative infrastructures (CIPS) do not aim for the collapse of the global order but for the creation of parallel networks capable of functioning outside a single center.

Beijing has theorized this transition as inevitable ("The Great Change Unseen in a Century”), not as a revolutionary act of will but as the effect of the global system's maturation.

Russia

Russia, more than China, has internalized the idea of confrontation with the existing order. Its strategy has been more:

- disruptive;

- asymmetric;

- oriented toward testing the limits of the Western system.

For Moscow, fragmentation is not a secondary risk but a strategic survival tool in a system perceived as hostile.

3. Doctrinal Level: Accelerationism

Accelerationism, as a theoretical doctrine, is not a geopolitical project but a philosophical reading of complex systems dynamics. Its central idea is simple: systems with structural contradictions do not reform through equilibrium but transform through intensification.

In its classical form:

- accelerationism does not "create” the crisis;

- it argues that accelerating existing processes brings the system's real limits to the surface.

Importantly, accelerationism does not require coordinated political intent.

It functions as an interpretive framework, not a government program.

4. First Coincidence: Facts Confirm the Theory

The first coincidence is relatively benign: factual reality seems to confirm the accelerationist intuition. Intensifying tensions does not stabilize the system-it fragments it.

This, in itself, does not prove more than:

- the theory correctly anticipated a possible dynamic;

- reality has entered a phase of structural stress.

One coincidence can easily be accidental.

5. Second Coincidence: State Strategies Converge Toward the Same Logic

The second coincidence is more problematic. Both China and Russia, though in different styles, have built strategies that rely on accelerating the delegitimization of the single center rather than repairing it.

Moreover:

- they do not attempt to save existing institutions;

- but make the transition functional outside them.

This is not doctrinal accelerationism, but it is a practical application of the same logic: the old system is not corrected but surpassed through the proliferation of alternatives.

6. Third Coincidence: The Western Reaction Reproduces the Same Dynamic

The major paradox is that the decisions of the United States accelerate exactly the processes that its rivals considered inevitable.

Through:

- institutional withdrawals;

- systemic sanctions;

- deliberate fragmentation of trade;

- the use of the dollar as a coercive instrument,

Washington does not counter multipolarity-it operationalizes it.

This is the third coincidence: the central actor produces effects compatible with both the strategy of its rivals and the accelerationist reading of history.

7. The Convergence Hypothesis: Not Coordination, but Shared Interpretation

When:

1. factual reality,

2. state strategies,

3. and an independent theoretical doctrine

lead to the same structural outcomes, the most economical explanation is not conspiracy but interpretive convergence.

All are reading the same underlying reality:

- the limits of the unipolar order;

- the costs of centralization;

- the fragility of single dependencies.

- The difference lies only in language:

- China calls it "multipolarity”;

- Russia treats it as an opportunity for rupture;

- accelerationism describes it as systemic inevitability;

- the U.S. probably produces it involuntarily through defensive and impulsive responses.

Disorganization Is No Longer an Accident

There is no evidence of coordination between accelerationism, China, and Russia. But there is something more important: an overlap of reasoning about the same historical reality.

When three different frameworks-factual, strategic, and doctrinal-lead in the same direction, the coincidence hypothesis weakens.

The more solid hypothesis remains:

the world has entered a phase in which disorganization is no longer an accident, but a form of transition.