The crisis in Greece

• Once upon a time, it was the "golden decade"

The 1960s and 1970s were the heyday of the Greek economy, with growth of almost 8% per year, expanding investment, and a stable fiscal regime. GDP per capita had risen from 60% to 80% of the EU average. Greece was attractive for business, with a credible monetary policy and social stability. But with the 1973 oil crisis and the fall of the military dictatorship, the economic engine began to creak.

Since 1979, Greece has been in an economic tailspin. In 1987, GDP was similar to that of the late 1970s. Inflation rose, unemployment increased, and the public deficit became unsustainable. Tax evasion expanded, and foreign investment fell sharply.

In the 1990s, governments attempted fiscal and monetary stabilization, with a view to joining the eurozone. Reforms were partially implemented, but public debt remained high - around 100% of GDP.

• The credit boom and the illusion of prosperity

In 2001, Greece joined the eurozone. The following years brought apparent but unsustainable economic growth, based on consumption and cheap loans. Government spending grew by 4.7% annually - double the eurozone average. Imports exploded, while exports remained modest. The illusion of prosperity was shattered by the global financial crisis.

• Radicalization of the political scene

Since 2010, Greece has been the scene of large-scale social movements - general strikes, occupations of public squares and buildings, spontaneous protests, local uprisings against infrastructure projects imposed from above. This effervescence has led to an accelerated erosion of the traditional parties - especially PASOK and New Democracy - perceived as guilty of imposing austerity measures dictated by the international troika (EU, ECB, IMF). In parallel with the rise of a radical left (personified by SYRIZA), on the other side of the political spectrum, a significant segment of the population, disillusioned, isolated and disoriented, was attracted by the nationalist, authoritarian and xenophobic messages of the Golden Dawn party. It obtained over 6% of the vote in the 2012 elections, entering Parliament for the first time and becoming a notable presence in the Greek political landscape.

• Tactics, rhetoric and roots

Golden Dawn combined populist discourse with a paramilitary aesthetic and violent actions, promoting an authoritarian model of "law and order" that resonated with segments of the working class and the petty bourgeoisie, severely affected by the crisis. Unlike the collectivist left, neo-Nazis have captured those layers of society that have not engaged in collective action and have internalized despair in an individualistic way, seeking scapegoats among immigrants, minorities, and politicians. Dangerously, the media, in search of an audience, has contributed to the legitimization of this group by promoting its visibility, even tolerating live televised attacks. At the same time, the authorities and mainstream parties have adopted a discourse increasingly close to that of the far right, contributing to the normalization of racist and authoritarian ideas - a spiral that culminated in the murder of anti-fascist rapper Pavlos Fyssas in 2013, which led to legal action against the leaders of Golden Dawn, accused of forming a criminal organization.

• Neofascism as a reflex of a crisis of hegemony

The Greek political crisis was not just a rupture of governance, but a crisis of hegemony: the rupture between citizens and the representative system, between the popular aces and the political elite. In this legitimacy vacuum, the far right presented itself as an "anti-system" alternative, although in essence it reflected a radicalized version of tendencies already present in official politics: the demonization of immigrants, the restriction of civil liberties, the imposition of brute authority in the name of "saving the nation". It is important to emphasize that the rise of neo-fascism in Greece was not an isolated accident, but part of a broader European trend, in which democracy is undermined in the name of "economic efficiency", and post-democratic forms of governance fuel resentment and extremism.

• Greek lessons

The Greek experience shows that, in the absence of a democratic, solidary and effective response to social crises, the ground is fertile for authoritarian forces that channel frustration into hatred and violence. Defending democracy means not only directly combating neo-fascism, but also rebuilding social trust, collective participation and economic justice, precisely these dimensions that were sacrificed in Greece in the name of austerity.

• Three bailouts, only one completed

Between 2010 and 2018, Greece received 275 billion euros in three assistance programs. Only the last one, started in 2015, was completed. The first two failed due to political crises and domestic populism. Creditors imposed tough reforms, and Greece had to promise annual budget surpluses of 3.5% of GDP by 2022, and 2.2% by 2060. The debt remained at the end of the deep crisis, the highest in the EU - 179% of GDP at the end of the program.

• Fragile recovery after the crisis

In 2022, Greece also emerged from the European Commission's extended surveillance. The budget is in surplus, the unemployment rate has fallen to 10% in 2023, and investor confidence is rising but still fragile. Bond yields are significantly lower than in 2010. Tax evasion remains a serious problem, and debt sustainability remains in question, especially in the context of renewed global economic turmoil and slowing growth in the euro area.

Greece now has an opportunity to rebuild its economy on solid foundations. But to do so, it needs political will, real reforms, and an effective administration. The experience of the crisis has shown how much it can cost to postpone tough decisions.